The Historicity of Oral Tradition and its Effect on the Biblical Traditions About David and Solomon
The following is a two-part paper discussing the findings of the latest reserach on the historicity of oral history and its effect on our understanding of the historicity of the biblical accounts of David and Solomon in Samuels, Kings, and Chronicles. The first part discusses the issue of the reliability of oral tradition; the second part, the problems associated with the biblical accounts of David and Solomon as they pertain to the issue of oral transmission.
The Reliability and Validity of Oral Tradition/History
Of concern here are not only oral traditions by itself, but an evaluation of the mechanisms of storage and transfer of a tradition: individual human memory and the collective memory of human groups. At the individual level, human memory can distort the past in several ways. First, since the brain simplifies sensory input, by selecting and rejecting certain data, it irrevocably limits the stored data, usually based on what the individual considered significant at the moment. Second, memories tend to be stored in stereotyped patterns, and recollection occurs in stock motifs and genres. 1 Further, every rehearsal of an event freezes it in its stock genre and "perfects it and moves it further from reality. 2 Third, similar events overwrite one another in memory, 3 and misrecall of names, dates, and places ensues. If prompted or "coached," people can "recall" events that never occurred, as well as change specific details of their recollection of the past. 4 Indeed, the greater the distance in time of an event, the more likely is its recollection to be influenced by misinformation. 5 Similarly, dates will be rounded to stereotypical values as they regress further into the past. 6 Fourth, different types of memory have different retention levels. Memory of events (episodic memory) tends to be less reliable than semantic memory, since it is based on single episodes, easily overwritten, and less rehearsed. 7 Fifth, not only does memory select data for retention but it interprets all that it experiences and subordinates its interpretation of an event to a preexisting world-view. With time, changing world-views will alter recollection of experiences. Therefore, individual memory as a whole can be very fluid.
Moreover, individuals do not always transmit memories unchanged. Ross and Beuhler have given three ways in which people vary their accounts of experiences: 1) they report only the portion that satisfies their current purpose; 2) they adapt the meaning or interpretation of their experiences to meet their needs; 3) they embellish the account to provide a more satisfying story. 8 Nevertheless, individual memory can recall accurately, as common sense shows, mitigating the negative evaluation above. Although studies show, for instance, that episodic memory can be fallible, another study shows that humans possess "archival memory," in which memories become fixed in the brain and will be transmitted accurately, even several years apart. 9 Moreover, certain types of events are more likely to be recalled reliably than others. An event that is remarkable (highly emotional, unique, etc.), for example, is more likely to be recalled accurately than an ordinary or typical event. 10 Furthermore, certain types of data lend themselves to easy recall. Places of events, for instance, are more likely to be remembered accurately than the time of events. Finally, recent events will be remembered more accurately than old events. Hence, diary accounts or reports written soon after the events are far more likely to detail faithfully an individual's experiences than his or her recollection many years later. As time passes, however, these memories get overwritten, conflated with other similar events, etc., and lose their reliability.
Collective memory also is a product of human recall, but at the group level. Schudson defined collective memory as "knowledge of the past based on a shared cultural stock of knowledge socially transmitted in lessons, rituals, traditions, proverbs, and other forms." 11 Collective memory is fluid for much the same reasons as individual memory. 12 For instance, to be passed along, collective memory needs to be freed of its dependence on a specific context, usually by narrativizing it. 13 Narrativization entails simplification, conventionalization, reordering of the memory, and recontextualization according to the perspectives of the group. Often, the initial encoding of the past into narrative results in dramatic change. Once an event has been encoded, however, the amount of change decelerates. Further, information that does not fit with the group's world-view will lose its relevance and disappear. Collective memory will interpolate "what seems more appropriate or more in keeping with [the group's] conception of the world." 14 For example, nascent Zionism suppressed the memory of the centuries-long Arab presence in Palestine in much the same way that the Chronicler and the Deuteronomistic Historian state that the land of Israel lay empty during the seventy years of exile. 15
As with individual memory, collective memory is not entirely fluid or relative. As Irwin-Zarecka noted, "collective memory is not a terrain where anything goes." 16 In agreement, Schudson stated, "The past is in some respects, and under some conditions, highly resistant to efforts to make it over." He pointed to three factors that limit the fluidity of collective memory: 17 1) the structure of available pasts, that is, the information that becomes a "given" in the group, gains its own inertia and resists change; 2) the structure of individual choice, according to which individuals are constrained in their choices about available pasts by such factors as trauma ("past experiences people . . . cannot ignore"), vicarious trauma (traumatic events in others' lives), channels (previous responses of a group have an inertia that cannot be ignored), and commitments (people have a stake in the past and cannot change it without some loss); and 3) the intersubjective conflicts among choosers, that is, various peoples' memories conflict with one another and shape their recollections.
Groups tend to construct their "canonical" pasts in similar ways. The "commemorative narrative," the master description of the group's past, concentrates on the origins of the group, its unity throughout its history, the rules by which it is identified and maintains its identity, critical turning points in its history, and a patterned, periodized and idealized description of how it reached its current state. The commemorative narrative continually provides a moral message for the adherents of the group. Obviously, the commemorative narrative and the Genesis--2 Kings are similar in form.
Oral tradition, one of several vehicles of collective memory, suffers from the same shortcomings as collective memory. It tends to typecast experiences into simplified genres, telescope events, conflate specific details with other tradition, etc. According to Shils, the "sheer existence of [traditions] disposes those who possess them to change them. The person who possesses a tradition and who depends on it is also impelled to modify it because it is not good enough for him [sic!]." 18 Hence, Finnegan has talked about the "inherent changeability" of oral tradition. 19 Shils offered several reasons why traditions change with time and telling: 1) People make rationalizations and corrections that provide greater clarity and coherence. 2) Changes in the socio-political status of the group transmitting the tradition will change the tradition and conform it to current social and political situations. 20 Specifically, changes in technology, morality, theology, perspective, ruling powers, etc., affect the tradition. 21 3) The influence of a charismatic figure who reinterprets the tradition. 4) The influence of other, apparently superior, traditions, either within the group or external to it. 5) Changes in the adherents themselves.
As seen in the discussion of collective memory, the initial encoding of events will include contextualization and conventionalization, resulting in losses, additions and distortions. Because the memories that store the tradition are fallible and the socio-political conditions in the life of the individuals and the group change, altering the perception of the past, the degree of distortion will increase with the transmission of the tradition to future generations. After a few generations very little historical data remain, each story becoming conflated with other stories, names and places changing, etc. 22 One study suggests that history changes to fiction by 150 years after the events. 23 The amount of historical data inhering in the tradition depends on the factors mentioned by Schudson.
An appropriate example of the fluidity and stability of oral tradition comes from Herodotus' account of the Egyptian kings (Book 2:99-146). The origin of Herodotus' account is certainly oral tradition, since he specifically noted that the material in 2:99-146 "rests on the accounts given me by the Egyptians." These "Egyptians" most likely were the priests of Memphis, 24 whose knowledge would have come from oral tradition, as well as some literary tradition learned in school. 25 Since many Egyptian documents contemporary to the pharaohs have been recovered in excavations, Herodotus' account can be compared to these documents and evaluated as history. His list of Egyptian Kings is as follows:
1. Min(os), followed by 330 kings (99[ 26 ]).
2. Moeris, perhaps Amenemhet III of the 12th dynasty. 27
3. Sesostris, whose name is that of the 12th dynasty Senwesret III, but whose alleged activities are an amalgam of Thutmose III and Ramesses II. 28
4. Pheros (111). Simply the word "pharaoh" personified. 29
5. Proteus (112), allegedly a contemporary of the Trojan war. No such individual is known in Egyptian texts. According to Lloyd, he comes from Greek legend, not Egyptian tradition, 30 indicating that by Herodotus' time Greek myth had infected Egyptian tradition.
6. Rhampsinitus (121), a corrupt recollection of the name Ramesses. 31
7. Cheops(!), a pharaoh of the 4th dynasty (Old Kingdom). Although Herodotus' Egyptian tradition correctly made him the builder of a pyramid, its chronology is nearly 2000 years off. 32 Also, Herodotus' Egyptian sources attribute to Cheops religious reforms that are suspiciously similar to those of Akhnaten. Amazingly, Herodotus knows absolutely nothing about the 18th dynasty, and virtually nothing of the 19th and 20th, the most powerful dynasties in Egyptian history. 33
8. Chephren.
9. Mycerinus. The latter two kings were the successors of Cheops. Mycerinus is credited with abrogating the reforms of Cheops (is this a garbled recollection of the activity of Tutankhamun?).
10. Asychis, probably Shoshenq I. 34
11. Anysis, a blind king (137).
12. Sabacos, who runs Anysis out of Egypt. This is Shabako, second king of the 25th dynasty. Egyptian tradition correctly recalled his Ethiopian (Cushite) background, but incorrectly attributed to him the withdrawal of the Ethiopians from Egypt. Significantly, the tradition knows nothing about Taharqa or the Assyrian invasion of Egypt, though it is only 200 years removed from him. 35 Herodotus' Egyptian sources consistently have telescoped several kings of a dynasty into a single individual who represents that dynasty.
13. Anytis returns (140).
14. Sethos. Although Seti I and II reigned during the 13th century BCE, 36 several hundred years before Shabako, the tradition has made him a contemporary of Sennacherib. According to Herodotus, the Ethiopians had already withdrawn from Egypt, contrary to the Bible and Assyrian texts. Throughout Herodotus' description of the Egyptian dynasties, fairytale and folktale motifs are "continually in evidence." 37
15. Psammetichus (151). At this point Herodotus noted that his sources change. He said that Greek sources now predominated, since during Psammetichus' reign Greeks first met Egypt (154). Significantly, a qualitative change occurs in his account. Not only is it far more accurate, but Herodotus also gives lengths of reigns that are very accurate.
16. After Psammetichus I follow in correct sequence: Necho, Psammetichus II, Hophra, and Amasis.
Several conclusions arise from this brief analysis. First, oral tradition is untrustworthy as a source of history. Although its stability is displayed in the occasional accurate transmission of names (Shabako, Khufu, Senwesret), broad sequence of events, and specific details (the remarkable and highly unusual Great Pyramid), its fluidity is far more pronounced, being evidenced by the gross distortions in chronology and sequence, attribution of deeds to the wrong individuals, omissions of significant people and events, patterning after folktale motifs and details, conflations of entire dynasties, and pure invention. Although Herodotus' sources probably came from the most educated class of individuals in ancient Egypt, they clearly had a very limited and distorted knowledge of their past. Moreover, it cannot be overstressed that ancient Egypt from the early 3rd millennium BCE kept written (indeed, public) records, and these priests would have had access to them had they wished. Second, the recollections of outsiders tend to be less distorted than that of the insiders, who have more stake in the tradition. Finally, the closer in time the material is to the present, the more accurate it is likely to be. The reverse is also true: the further away it is, the less accurate.
From this discussion, several criteria for evaluating the historicity of a tradition arise, although clearly it is impossible to predict exactly what elements of any given oral tradition will be historical. As Fentriss and Wickham stated, "We have no way of knowing, a priori, where, in oral tradition, historical facts are likely to be." 38 In agreement, J. K. Davies concluded, "All one can offer is a carefully weighed verdict of probability, the degree of which (and this is crucial . . . ) is not uniform for the whole logos [tradition] but will vary according as we can or cannot see reason for rejection of detail or decoration or structural component." 39
Several criteria are grounds for rejecting a tradition as a whole: anachronisms central to the tradition, records of impossible or extremely improbable events, accounts that are clearly etiological or created to legitimize socio-political institutions, accounts whose central plot and themes are pure folklore, accounts that conflict with other more reliable information, and accounts whose details are not in keeping with the language, culture, etc., of the host society. 40 Further, particularly artistic stories are more likely to change and contain non- historical data and embellishment. 41 Traditions, therefore, whose primary purpose is to entertain should be rejected. Finally, accounts that lack specific details, such as names of individuals, times of the events, place it occurred, etc., are likely to be fictional, especially if their genre is folklore. In contrast, accounts that contain much specific, non-stereotyped detail (see ahead) are more likely to be historical. Also, if the basic storyline falls outside the criteria above, it should be accepted, since this aspect of a tradition tends to be stable. Further, traditions that record events that are out of the ordinary are more likely to contain a historical kernel.
Regarding the specific data in a tradition, a few criteria exist for evaluating their historicity. First, any specific datum that belongs to the stereotyped genre should be rejected. The information may be historical, but is suspect without corroboration. Second, names, dates, and places are likely to change in transmission. 42 Place names tend to be more stable than dates or names. Dates will tend to become stereotyped, and any stock numbers within the group broader tradition should be rejected. Similarly, numbers tend to become larger with each telling. Names will migrate from story to story, and important individuals are likely to attract traditions about other individuals. Therefore, strongly stereotypical stories about major figures in a narrative should either be rejected or viewed with extreme skepticism.
At this point, we can conclude that if the narratives about David and
Solomon found in the Bible are the product of any significant period of
oral transmission, there are strong reasons to be extremely cautious about
using them as historical information. Part Two discusses the latest evidence
regarding the degree of literacy at the approximate time of David and Solomon.
1. In sum, "memories simplify themselves" (M. Linten, "Phoenix and Chimera: The Changing Faces of Memory," in Memory and History, ed. J. Jeffrey and G. Edwall [Lanham: University Press of AmerIica, 1994], 79).
2. D. A. Ritchie, "Foreword," in Memory and History, ed. J. Jeffrey and G. Edwall (Lanham: University Press of America, 1994) vii.
3. A. Baddeley, Human Memory: Theory and Practice (Hover and Longdon: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1990) 246ff. Whether the original memory is permanently overwritten or stored in some other form is unknown.
4. Many recent studies have shown this (See E. F. Loftus, "Tricked by Memory," in Memory and History, ed. J. Jeffrey and G. Edwall [Lanham: University Press of America, 1994] 18).
6. N. M. Bradburn, J. Huttenlocher, and L. Hedges, "Telescoping and Temporal Memory," in Autobiographical Memory and the Validity of Retrospective Reports, ed. N. Schwarz and S. Sudman (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1994 215. This phenomenon is seen in the Bible's penchant for round numbers (20, 40, 80, etc.).
8. M. Ross, and R. Buehler, "On Authenticating and Using Personal Recollections," in Autobiographical Memory and the Validity of Retrospective Reports, ed. N. Schwarz and S. Sudman (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1994) 55-56.
9. A. M. Hoffmann, and H. S. Hoffman, Archives of Memory (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1990) 145-46.
11. M. Schudson, "Preservation of the Past in Mental Life," The Quarterly Newsletter of the Laboratory of Comparative Human Cognition 9 (1987) 5. This is only part of his overall definition of collective memory, but it is the part that is germane to this discussion.
12. In two articles Schwartz discussed the two schools of thought on the nature of collective memory: the Mead\Halbwachs school, which argues that collective memory is essentially a product of the present and discontinuous with the past, and the Durkheim\Shils school, which argues for the continuity of the past and present. Schwartz criticized the Mead/Halbwachs school for ignoring the "guiding pattern that endows different generations with a common heritage," while he criticized the Durkheim/Shils school for underestimating the role that society plays in revising collective memory to suit its own needs ("The Social Context of Commemoration: A Study in Collective Memory," Social Forces 61 [1982] 374-77; "The Reconstruction of Abraham Lincoln," in Collective Remembering, ed. D. Middleton and D. Edwards [London: Sage Publications, 1990] 82-83). Schwartz, I believe rightly, argued that the past and present influence each other, and hence, collective memory is restrained by the inertia of tradition and is somewhat stable and resistant to change. He wrote, "Supervising the past through their own archival or commemorative enterprises, institutions such as the state, church, and family seek to ensure that traditional conceptions of the past remain independent of the experiences of different generations. Thus, the earliest construction of an historical object limits the range of things subsequent generations can do with it" ("Social Change and Collective Memory: The Democratization of George Washington," ASR 56 [1991] 232). On the changing picture of George Washington, for instance, he concluded, "We find the past to be neither totally precarious nor immutable, but a stable image upon which new elements are intermittently superimposed" (Ibid., 234).
13. J. Fentriss, and C. Wickham, Social Memory (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992) 41, 93.
14. Fentriss and Wickham, 58-59.
15. Y. Zerubavel, Recovered Roots (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1995) 215.
16. I. Irwin-Zarecka, Frames of Remembrance: The Dynamics of Collective Memory (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1995) 18. See also Zerubavel, 5.
18. E. Shils, Tradition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981) 213.
19. According to Finnegan, oral traditions are more susceptible to change for several reasons: they are open to all the standard forms of distortion found in written sources; they are performed orally and hence subject to variations; if they are passed on for several generations, they will be performed by different people, all with different interests; they are influenced by the audience; they are affected by current cultural situations in a way written texts are not (R. Finnegan, "A Note on Oral Tradition and Historical Evidence," in Oral History an Interdisciplinary Anthology, ed. D. K. Dunaway and W. K. Baum [ Nashville: American Association for State and Local History, 1984] 113).
20. See also Finnegan, 113. This is true of genealogies as well.
21. Ancient historians also had to consider the persuasiveness of their accounts, since they were read to audiences. They also used rhetoric and invention to enhance the credibility of their material (M. J. Wheeldon, "'True Stories': The Reception of Historiography in Antiquity," in History as Text The Writing of Ancient History, ed. A. Cameron [London, Duckworth, 1989] 39), just as the Bible uses etiology.
22. See R. C. Culley, "Oral Tradition and Historicity," in Studies on the Ancient Palestinian World, ed. J. W. Wevers and D. B. Redford (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972) 111; M. I. Finley, "Myth, Memory and History," in The Use and Abuse of History (London: Chatto & Windus, 1975) 11-33; J. Vansina, Oral Tradition as History, (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985) 41, 53, 121.
23. Culley, 110. This is probably the amount of time between the events of the 10th century and their writing down in the 8th century or later.
24. A. B. Lloyd, Herodotus Book II: Introduction and Commentary, 3 Volumes (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1975-86) 1:90.
26. These numbers refer to the paragraph in Herodotus Book 2.
28. D. B. Redford, Egypt, Canaan, and Israel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992) 309; Lloyd, 3:16.
32. According to Lloyd (1:185), this is Herodotus' error, but there is little basis for his conclusion. In addition, the interior of the pyramid is described incorrectly (Lloyd, 1:94).
33. W. W. How, A Commentary on Herodotus, 2 Volumes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936) 419. Most likely, this is because his sources were priests of Memphis, whose concerns and knowledge would naturally favor northern Egypt.
35. This is true probably for the same reason that he knows nothing of the 18th dynasty.
36. Lloyd believed this is a corruption of Shebitku of the 25th dynasty, but there is no reason to believe this other than a propensity of harmonize Herodotus' account with known Egyptian history, a tendency amply attested in Lloyd's commentary.
39. J. K. Davies, "The Reliability of Oral Tradition," in The Trojan War Its Historicity and Context, ed. L. Foxhall and J. K. Davies (Bristol: Bristol Classical Press) 94.
40. See J. K. Davies, 94, for a further discussion.